A Connectivity Game with Incomplete Information on Jammer’s Location

Andrey Garnaev, Wade Trappe

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this paper we consider the problem of maintaining communication between a transmitter and a receiver in the presence of hostile interference. To maintain communication the transmitter must keep the SINR greater or equal to an SINR threshold, while the adversary aims to break the communication by making this SINR less than this threshold. In particular, we focus on investigating how incomplete information about the adversary’s location can impact the rival’s strategies. Namely, we assume that the transmitter does not know the adversary’s location, but knows only an a priori distribution of possible adversary locations. The problem is formulated as a non-zero Bayesian game between the transmitter and the adversary in a Nash and Stackelberg framework for Rayleigh channel fading gains. Existence and uniqueness of both type of equilibria are proven and derived in closed form. We prove theoretically, and numerically illustrate, that the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy for the transmitter can be non-sensitive to the a priori information, while the Nash equilibrium strategy for the transmitter is always sensitive to such information. The condition when the Stackelberg transmitter equilibrium strategy is non-sensitive to a priori information is derived.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationInternet of Things, Smart Spaces, and Next Generation Networks and Systems - 19th International Conference, NEW2AN 2019, and 12th Conference, ruSMART 2019, Proceedings
EditorsOlga Galinina, Sergey Andreev, Yevgeni Koucheryavy, Sergey Balandin
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages256-268
Number of pages13
ISBN (Print)9783030308582
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019
Event19th International Conference on Next Generation Teletraffic and Wired/Wireless Advanced Networks and Systems, NEW2AN 2019, and 12th Conference on Internet of Things and Smart Spaces, ruSMART 2019 - St. Petersburg, Russian Federation
Duration: Aug 26 2019Aug 28 2019

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume11660 LNCS

Conference

Conference19th International Conference on Next Generation Teletraffic and Wired/Wireless Advanced Networks and Systems, NEW2AN 2019, and 12th Conference on Internet of Things and Smart Spaces, ruSMART 2019
CountryRussian Federation
CitySt. Petersburg
Period8/26/198/28/19

Fingerprint

Incomplete Information
Transmitter
Transmitters
Connectivity
Game
Communication
Stackelberg Equilibrium
Rayleigh Fading Channel
Nash Equilibrium
Fading channels
Closed-form
Existence and Uniqueness
Receiver
Interference
Strategy

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

Keywords

  • Bayesian equilibrium
  • Connectivity

Cite this

Garnaev, A., & Trappe, W. (2019). A Connectivity Game with Incomplete Information on Jammer’s Location. In O. Galinina, S. Andreev, Y. Koucheryavy, & S. Balandin (Eds.), Internet of Things, Smart Spaces, and Next Generation Networks and Systems - 19th International Conference, NEW2AN 2019, and 12th Conference, ruSMART 2019, Proceedings (pp. 256-268). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11660 LNCS). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30859-9_22
Garnaev, Andrey ; Trappe, Wade. / A Connectivity Game with Incomplete Information on Jammer’s Location. Internet of Things, Smart Spaces, and Next Generation Networks and Systems - 19th International Conference, NEW2AN 2019, and 12th Conference, ruSMART 2019, Proceedings. editor / Olga Galinina ; Sergey Andreev ; Yevgeni Koucheryavy ; Sergey Balandin. Springer Verlag, 2019. pp. 256-268 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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Garnaev, A & Trappe, W 2019, A Connectivity Game with Incomplete Information on Jammer’s Location. in O Galinina, S Andreev, Y Koucheryavy & S Balandin (eds), Internet of Things, Smart Spaces, and Next Generation Networks and Systems - 19th International Conference, NEW2AN 2019, and 12th Conference, ruSMART 2019, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 11660 LNCS, Springer Verlag, pp. 256-268, 19th International Conference on Next Generation Teletraffic and Wired/Wireless Advanced Networks and Systems, NEW2AN 2019, and 12th Conference on Internet of Things and Smart Spaces, ruSMART 2019, St. Petersburg, Russian Federation, 8/26/19. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30859-9_22

A Connectivity Game with Incomplete Information on Jammer’s Location. / Garnaev, Andrey; Trappe, Wade.

Internet of Things, Smart Spaces, and Next Generation Networks and Systems - 19th International Conference, NEW2AN 2019, and 12th Conference, ruSMART 2019, Proceedings. ed. / Olga Galinina; Sergey Andreev; Yevgeni Koucheryavy; Sergey Balandin. Springer Verlag, 2019. p. 256-268 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11660 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Garnaev A, Trappe W. A Connectivity Game with Incomplete Information on Jammer’s Location. In Galinina O, Andreev S, Koucheryavy Y, Balandin S, editors, Internet of Things, Smart Spaces, and Next Generation Networks and Systems - 19th International Conference, NEW2AN 2019, and 12th Conference, ruSMART 2019, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 2019. p. 256-268. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30859-9_22