TY - GEN
T1 - Analyzing the Economic Impact of Decentralization on Users
AU - Levy, Amit
AU - Weinberg, S. Matthew
AU - Zhou, Chenghan
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © Amit Levy, S. Matthew Weinberg, and Chenghan Zhou.
PY - 2026
Y1 - 2026
N2 - We model the ultimate price paid by users of a decentralized ledger as resulting from a two-stage game where Miners (/Proposers/etc.) first purchase blockspace via a Tullock contest, and then price that space to users. When analyzing our distributed ledger model, we find: A characterization of all possible pure equilibria (although pure equilibria are not guaranteed to exist). A natural sufficient condition, implied by Regularity (à la [34]), for existence of a “market-clearing” pure equilibrium where Miners choose to sell all space allocated by the Distributed Ledger Protocol, and that this equilibrium is unique. The market share of the largest miner is the relevant “measure of decentralization” to determine whether a market-clearing pure equilibrium exists. Block rewards do not impact users’ prices at equilibrium, when pure equilibria exist. But, higher block rewards can cause pure equilibria to exist. We also discuss aspects of our model and how they relate to blockchains deployed in practice. For example, only “patient” users (who are happy for their transactions to enter the blockchain under any miner) would enjoy the conclusions highlighted by our model, whereas “impatient” users (who are interested only for their transaction to be included in the very next block) still face monopoly pricing.
AB - We model the ultimate price paid by users of a decentralized ledger as resulting from a two-stage game where Miners (/Proposers/etc.) first purchase blockspace via a Tullock contest, and then price that space to users. When analyzing our distributed ledger model, we find: A characterization of all possible pure equilibria (although pure equilibria are not guaranteed to exist). A natural sufficient condition, implied by Regularity (à la [34]), for existence of a “market-clearing” pure equilibrium where Miners choose to sell all space allocated by the Distributed Ledger Protocol, and that this equilibrium is unique. The market share of the largest miner is the relevant “measure of decentralization” to determine whether a market-clearing pure equilibrium exists. Block rewards do not impact users’ prices at equilibrium, when pure equilibria exist. But, higher block rewards can cause pure equilibria to exist. We also discuss aspects of our model and how they relate to blockchains deployed in practice. For example, only “patient” users (who are happy for their transactions to enter the blockchain under any miner) would enjoy the conclusions highlighted by our model, whereas “impatient” users (who are interested only for their transaction to be included in the very next block) still face monopoly pricing.
KW - Blockchain
KW - Blockspace Markets
KW - Cryptocurrency
KW - Decentralization
KW - Distributed Ledgers
KW - Equilibrium Analysis
KW - Tullock Contests
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105037331463
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105037331463#tab=citedBy
U2 - 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.93
DO - 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.93
M3 - Conference contribution
T3 - Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs
BT - 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference,ITCS 2026
A2 - Saraf, Shubhangi
PB - Schloss Dagstuhl- Leibniz-Zentrum fur Informatik GmbH, Dagstuhl Publishing
T2 - 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, ITCS 2026
Y2 - 27 January 2026 through 30 January 2026
ER -