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Analyzing the Economic Impact of Decentralization on Users

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

We model the ultimate price paid by users of a decentralized ledger as resulting from a two-stage game where Miners (/Proposers/etc.) first purchase blockspace via a Tullock contest, and then price that space to users. When analyzing our distributed ledger model, we find: A characterization of all possible pure equilibria (although pure equilibria are not guaranteed to exist). A natural sufficient condition, implied by Regularity (à la [34]), for existence of a “market-clearing” pure equilibrium where Miners choose to sell all space allocated by the Distributed Ledger Protocol, and that this equilibrium is unique. The market share of the largest miner is the relevant “measure of decentralization” to determine whether a market-clearing pure equilibrium exists. Block rewards do not impact users’ prices at equilibrium, when pure equilibria exist. But, higher block rewards can cause pure equilibria to exist. We also discuss aspects of our model and how they relate to blockchains deployed in practice. For example, only “patient” users (who are happy for their transactions to enter the blockchain under any miner) would enjoy the conclusions highlighted by our model, whereas “impatient” users (who are interested only for their transaction to be included in the very next block) still face monopoly pricing.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference,ITCS 2026
EditorsShubhangi Saraf
PublisherSchloss Dagstuhl- Leibniz-Zentrum fur Informatik GmbH, Dagstuhl Publishing
ISBN (Electronic)9783959774130
DOIs
StatePublished - 2026
Event17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, ITCS 2026 - Milan, Italy
Duration: Jan 27 2026 → Jan 30 2026

Publication series

NameLeibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs
Volume362

Conference

Conference17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, ITCS 2026
Country/TerritoryItaly
CityMilan
Period1/27/26 → 1/30/26

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software

Keywords

  • Blockchain
  • Blockspace Markets
  • Cryptocurrency
  • Decentralization
  • Distributed Ledgers
  • Equilibrium Analysis
  • Tullock Contests

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