Authentication logic supporting synchronization, revocation, and recency

Stuart G. Stubblebine; Rebecca N. Wright

doi:10.1145/238168.238195

Authentication logic supporting synchronization, revocation, and recency

Stuart G. Stubblebine
, Rebecca N. Wright

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › peer-review

25 Scopus citations

Abstract

A logic for analyzing cryptographic protocols and has the capability to specify time and synchronization details is presented. Such capability considerably advances the scope of known techniques for both expressing practical authentication policies of protocol participants as constraints, and for reasoning about protocol goals subject to these constraints. The logic is flexible and can support a wide range of security policies. Lastly, the ability to reason about the conjunction of individual participant policies and protocols will be especially important as public and private key infrastructures are deployed and new and unanticipated policies are put into use.

Original language	American English
Pages	95-105
Number of pages	11
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/238168.238195
State	Published - 1996
Externally published	Yes
Event	Proceedings of the 1996 3rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security - New Delhi, India Duration: Mar 14 1996 → Mar 16 1996

Other

Other	Proceedings of the 1996 3rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
City	New Delhi, India
Period	3/14/96 → 3/16/96

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Software
Computer Networks and Communications

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10.1145/238168.238195

Cite this

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title = "Authentication logic supporting synchronization, revocation, and recency",

abstract = "A logic for analyzing cryptographic protocols and has the capability to specify time and synchronization details is presented. Such capability considerably advances the scope of known techniques for both expressing practical authentication policies of protocol participants as constraints, and for reasoning about protocol goals subject to these constraints. The logic is flexible and can support a wide range of security policies. Lastly, the ability to reason about the conjunction of individual participant policies and protocols will be especially important as public and private key infrastructures are deployed and new and unanticipated policies are put into use.",

author = "Stubblebine, \{Stuart G.\} and Wright, \{Rebecca N.\}",

year = "1996",

doi = "10.1145/238168.238195",

language = "American English",

pages = "95--105",

note = "Proceedings of the 1996 3rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security ; Conference date: 14-03-1996 Through 16-03-1996",

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T1 - Authentication logic supporting synchronization, revocation, and recency

AU - Stubblebine, Stuart G.

AU - Wright, Rebecca N.

PY - 1996

Y1 - 1996

N2 - A logic for analyzing cryptographic protocols and has the capability to specify time and synchronization details is presented. Such capability considerably advances the scope of known techniques for both expressing practical authentication policies of protocol participants as constraints, and for reasoning about protocol goals subject to these constraints. The logic is flexible and can support a wide range of security policies. Lastly, the ability to reason about the conjunction of individual participant policies and protocols will be especially important as public and private key infrastructures are deployed and new and unanticipated policies are put into use.

AB - A logic for analyzing cryptographic protocols and has the capability to specify time and synchronization details is presented. Such capability considerably advances the scope of known techniques for both expressing practical authentication policies of protocol participants as constraints, and for reasoning about protocol goals subject to these constraints. The logic is flexible and can support a wide range of security policies. Lastly, the ability to reason about the conjunction of individual participant policies and protocols will be especially important as public and private key infrastructures are deployed and new and unanticipated policies are put into use.

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0029711077

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0029711077#tab=citedBy

U2 - 10.1145/238168.238195

DO - 10.1145/238168.238195

M3 - Paper

SP - 95

EP - 105

T2 - Proceedings of the 1996 3rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Y2 - 14 March 1996 through 16 March 1996

ER -

Authentication logic supporting synchronization, revocation, and recency

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