Corporate Political Transparency

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Corporations are facing a growing demand for the transparency of political contributions. In the United States, this demand has largely focused on the implementation of a mandatory disclosure law. It rests on the assumption that legal enforcement can make it easier to observe the ties between corporations and political parties. In this study, I challenge this assumption. I build my case by first developing a conceptual foundation of corporate political transparency (CPT). I argue that in the absence of economic benefits, legal enforcement has a limited effect on CPT. Instead of encouraging transparency, mandatory disclosure can lead to the concealment of corporate political contributions. To develop a model of concealment, I borrow the characterizations of disguise from theatrical drama. Using the context of Indian firms, I show the limitation of mandatory disclosure and the efficacy of regulatory incentive. My study highlights the need for a broader debate on CPT to understand the relative implications of regulatory policies.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)644-678
Number of pages35
JournalBusiness and Society
Volume58
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2019

Fingerprint

transparency
corporation
regulatory policy
demand
drama
incentive
Transparency
firm
Law
economics
Mandatory disclosure
Legal enforcement
Political contributions

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

Cite this

Mithani, Murad. / Corporate Political Transparency. In: Business and Society. 2019 ; Vol. 58, No. 3. pp. 644-678.
@article{dc9fe84009a842ddb34d0d70fbbb5606,
title = "Corporate Political Transparency",
abstract = "Corporations are facing a growing demand for the transparency of political contributions. In the United States, this demand has largely focused on the implementation of a mandatory disclosure law. It rests on the assumption that legal enforcement can make it easier to observe the ties between corporations and political parties. In this study, I challenge this assumption. I build my case by first developing a conceptual foundation of corporate political transparency (CPT). I argue that in the absence of economic benefits, legal enforcement has a limited effect on CPT. Instead of encouraging transparency, mandatory disclosure can lead to the concealment of corporate political contributions. To develop a model of concealment, I borrow the characterizations of disguise from theatrical drama. Using the context of Indian firms, I show the limitation of mandatory disclosure and the efficacy of regulatory incentive. My study highlights the need for a broader debate on CPT to understand the relative implications of regulatory policies.",
author = "Murad Mithani",
year = "2019",
month = "3",
day = "1",
doi = "https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650316679991",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "58",
pages = "644--678",
journal = "Business and Society",
issn = "0007-6503",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Ltd",
number = "3",

}

Corporate Political Transparency. / Mithani, Murad.

In: Business and Society, Vol. 58, No. 3, 01.03.2019, p. 644-678.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Corporate Political Transparency

AU - Mithani, Murad

PY - 2019/3/1

Y1 - 2019/3/1

N2 - Corporations are facing a growing demand for the transparency of political contributions. In the United States, this demand has largely focused on the implementation of a mandatory disclosure law. It rests on the assumption that legal enforcement can make it easier to observe the ties between corporations and political parties. In this study, I challenge this assumption. I build my case by first developing a conceptual foundation of corporate political transparency (CPT). I argue that in the absence of economic benefits, legal enforcement has a limited effect on CPT. Instead of encouraging transparency, mandatory disclosure can lead to the concealment of corporate political contributions. To develop a model of concealment, I borrow the characterizations of disguise from theatrical drama. Using the context of Indian firms, I show the limitation of mandatory disclosure and the efficacy of regulatory incentive. My study highlights the need for a broader debate on CPT to understand the relative implications of regulatory policies.

AB - Corporations are facing a growing demand for the transparency of political contributions. In the United States, this demand has largely focused on the implementation of a mandatory disclosure law. It rests on the assumption that legal enforcement can make it easier to observe the ties between corporations and political parties. In this study, I challenge this assumption. I build my case by first developing a conceptual foundation of corporate political transparency (CPT). I argue that in the absence of economic benefits, legal enforcement has a limited effect on CPT. Instead of encouraging transparency, mandatory disclosure can lead to the concealment of corporate political contributions. To develop a model of concealment, I borrow the characterizations of disguise from theatrical drama. Using the context of Indian firms, I show the limitation of mandatory disclosure and the efficacy of regulatory incentive. My study highlights the need for a broader debate on CPT to understand the relative implications of regulatory policies.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85061577358&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85061577358&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650316679991

DO - https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650316679991

M3 - Article

VL - 58

SP - 644

EP - 678

JO - Business and Society

JF - Business and Society

SN - 0007-6503

IS - 3

ER -