Do bankers sacrifice value to build empires? Managerial incentives, industry consolidation, and financial performance

  • Joseph P. Hughes
  • , William W. Lang
  • , Loretta J. Mester
  • , Choon Geol Moon
  • , Michael S. Pagano

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Bank consolidation is a global phenomenon that may enhance stakeholders' value if managers do not sacrifice value to build empires. We find strong evidence of managerial entrenchment at US bank holding companies that have higher levels of managerial ownership, better growth opportunities, poorer financial performance, and smaller asset size. At banks without entrenched management, both asset acquisitions and sales are associated with improved performance. At banks with entrenched management, sales are related to smaller improvements while acquisitions are associated with worse performance. Consistent with scale economies, an increase in assets by internal growth is associated with better performance at most banks.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)417-447
Number of pages31
JournalJournal of Banking and Finance
Volume27
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2003

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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