Dreams, nightmares, and a defense against arguments from evil

Gabriel Citron

doi:10.5840/faithphil20157641

Dreams, nightmares, and a defense against arguments from evil

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper appeals to the phenomenon of dreaming to provide a novel defense against arguments from evil. The thrust of the argument is as follows: when we wake up after a nightmare, we are often filled entirely with relief, and do not consider ourselves to have actually suffered very much at all; and since it is epistemically possible that this whole life is simply a dream, it follows that it is epistemically possible that in reality there is very little suffering. This epistemic possibility decisively undermines a key premise of both logical and evidential arguments from evil.

Original language	American English
Pages (from-to)	247-270
Number of pages	24
Journal	Faith and Philosophy
Volume	32
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil20157641
State	Published - Jul 1 2015
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Religious studies
Philosophy

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10.5840/faithphil20157641

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AB - This paper appeals to the phenomenon of dreaming to provide a novel defense against arguments from evil. The thrust of the argument is as follows: when we wake up after a nightmare, we are often filled entirely with relief, and do not consider ourselves to have actually suffered very much at all; and since it is epistemically possible that this whole life is simply a dream, it follows that it is epistemically possible that in reality there is very little suffering. This epistemic possibility decisively undermines a key premise of both logical and evidential arguments from evil.

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Dreams, nightmares, and a defense against arguments from evil

Abstract

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