Fair allocation of indivisible goods to asymmetric agents

Alireza Farhadi, Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi, David Pennock, Mohammad Ghodsi, Masoud Seddighin, Sebastien Lahaie, Saeed Seddighin, Hadi Yami

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with unequal entitlements. Our emphasis is on the case where the goods are indivisible and agents have unequal entitlements. This problem is a generalization of the work by Procaccia and Wang [14] wherein the agents are assumed to be symmetric. We show that, in some cases with n agents, no allocation can guarantee better than 1/n approximation of a fair allocation when the entitlements are not necessarily equal. Furthermore, we devise a simple algorithm that ensures a 1/n approximation guarantee. Next, we assume that the valuation of every agent for each good is bounded by the total value he wishes to receive in a fair allocation. We show it enables us to find a 1/2 approximation fair allocation via a greedy algorithm. Finally, we run some experiments on real-world data and show that, in practice, a fair allocation is likely to exist. We also support our experiments by showing positive results for two stochastic variants of the problem, namely stochastic agents and stochastic items. (The full version of the paper is available in https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.01649.).

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publication16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017
EditorsEdmund Durfee, Michael Winikoff, Kate Larson, Sanmay Das
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages1535-1537
Number of pages3
ISBN (Electronic)9781510855076
StatePublished - 2017
Externally publishedYes
Event16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017 - Sao Paulo, Brazil
Duration: May 8 2017May 12 2017

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
Volume3

Conference

Conference16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017
Country/TerritoryBrazil
CitySao Paulo
Period5/8/175/12/17

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering

Keywords

  • Approximation
  • Entitlements
  • Fairness
  • Indivisible
  • Proportionality
  • Stochastic

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