Abstract
This chapter considers how moral duties not to harm and those to aid differ, the idea of morally innocent threats, and the role of self-defense in making one safe when not all are safe. These ideas are used to help justify twelve proposals for dealing with future pandemics, including some moral requirements, that aim to be consistent with the views of even those most concerned about personal liberty. The chapter also examines the limits some moral philosophers recommend on interpersonally aggregating losses and benefits and how this affects the morality of hospitals postponing elective medical procedures and the morality of requiring lockdowns. It concludes that imposing relatively small harms on each of many people in order to prevent loss of others’ lives could sometimes be justified to those with libertarian-like views.
| Original language | American English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Pandemic Ethics |
| Subtitle of host publication | From COVID-19 to Disease X |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Pages | 119-138 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191967900 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780192871688 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 2023 |
| Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Arts and Humanities
Keywords
- COVID-19
- aggregation
- aid
- harm
- libertarianism
- liberty
- lockdowns
- pandemic
- rights
- self-defense
Fingerprint
Dive into the research topics of 'Handling Future Pandemics: Harming, Not Aiding, and Liberty'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Cite this
- APA
- Author
- BIBTEX
- Harvard
- Standard
- RIS
- Vancouver