Intentionality and Naturalism

Stephen Stich, Stephen Laurence

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

A satisfactory account of what it is to "naturalize the intentional"-an account that makes sense of what Fodor sees as "the deepest motivation for intentional irrealism"-must satisfy two constraints. First, it will have to sustain an argument from the premise that intentional notions can't be naturalized to the conclusion that intentional irrealism or some other deeply troubling doctrine is true. Second, there must be some reason to think that, when "naturalizing" is unpacked along the lines proposed, it is in fact the case that the intentional can't be naturalized. This chapter argues that, while various accounts will satisfy one or the other of these constraints, there is no account of what it is to naturalize the intentional that will satisfy both of them. To support this contention, it surveys a number of proposals on what "naturalization" comes to, and goes on to argue that none of these candidates will satisfy both of the constraints.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationCollected Papers
Subtitle of host publicationMind and Language, 1972-2010
PublisherOxford University Press
Volume1
ISBN (Electronic)9780190267513
ISBN (Print)9780199734108
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 22 2011

Fingerprint

Naturalism
Doctrine
Naturalization
Intentionality

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Keywords

  • Intentional irrealism
  • Intentionality
  • Jerry fodor
  • Naturalism
  • Naturalization

Cite this

Stich, S., & Laurence, S. (2011). Intentionality and Naturalism. In Collected Papers: Mind and Language, 1972-2010 (Vol. 1). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199734108.003.0010
Stich, Stephen ; Laurence, Stephen. / Intentionality and Naturalism. Collected Papers: Mind and Language, 1972-2010. Vol. 1 Oxford University Press, 2011.
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Stich, S & Laurence, S 2011, Intentionality and Naturalism. in Collected Papers: Mind and Language, 1972-2010. vol. 1, Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199734108.003.0010

Intentionality and Naturalism. / Stich, Stephen; Laurence, Stephen.

Collected Papers: Mind and Language, 1972-2010. Vol. 1 Oxford University Press, 2011.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

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Stich S, Laurence S. Intentionality and Naturalism. In Collected Papers: Mind and Language, 1972-2010. Vol. 1. Oxford University Press. 2011 https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199734108.003.0010