Even on orthodox views, knowledge is related to action and to practical reasoning. For, knowledge implies belief, and of course belief influences action. Knowledge also implies truth and justification, and so action on the basis of knowledge will often have good features. It will tend to be successful and reasonable. But if belief is understood, as it often is in the tradition, as merely having high confidence, one won’t always be willing to act on one’s knowledge. You might have a high degree of confidence that a dish on the menu doesn’t contain shellfish, but if you’re allergic, a high degree of confidence won’t be enough for you to order the dish. Similarly, if justification is understood, as it usually is in the tradition, as merely having good reasons or evidence, one won’t always be reasonable to act on one’s knowledge in situations in which that knowledge is relevant. You might not be reasonable to order that dish, if you are allergic.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Title of host publication||Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology|
|Publisher||Taylor and Francis|
|Number of pages||9|
|State||Published - Jan 1 2018|
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Arts and Humanities(all)