Is role-functionalism committed to epiphenomenalism?

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19 Scopus citations

Abstract

Role-functionalism for mental events attempts to avoid epiphenomenalism without psychophysical identities. The paper addresses the question of whether it can succeed. It is argued that there is considerable reason to believe it cannot avoid epiphenomenalism, and that if it cannot, then it is untenable. It is pointed out, however, that even if role-functionalism is indeed an untenable theory of mental events, a role-functionalism account of mental dispositions has some intuitive plausibility.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)39-66
Number of pages28
JournalJournal of Consciousness Studies
Volume13
Issue number1-2
StatePublished - Jan 2006

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics
  • Philosophy
  • Psychology (miscellaneous)
  • Artificial Intelligence

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