Managing reputation through collusion

Michael L. Barnett, Andreas G.F. Hoepner, Sean Lux, Irena Timofeeva

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

Abstract

Do firms collude to improve their reputations? We examine Fortune's America's Most Admired Companies (AMAC) reputation scores from 1985 to 2010. We find that those firms deemed to have greater concern for reputation and opportunity to interact had significantly higher AMAC scores. These results support the existence of reputation collusion.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages1356-1361
Number of pages6
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012
Externally publishedYes
Event72nd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2012 - Boston, United States
Duration: Aug 7 2012Aug 10 2012

Other

Other72nd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2012
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityBoston
Period8/7/128/10/12

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Industrial relations
  • Management of Technology and Innovation
  • Management Information Systems

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Managing reputation through collusion'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this