Nash and Bayes–Nash equilibria in strategic-form games with intransitivities

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Abstract

We study games with intransitive preferences that admit skew-symmetric representations. We introduce the notion of surrogate better-reply security for discontinuous skew-symmetric games and elucidate the relationship between surrogate better-reply security and other security concepts in the literature. We then prove existence of behavioral strategy equilibrium for discontinuous skew-symmetric games of incomplete information (and, in particular, existence of mixed-strategy equilibrium for discontinuous skew-symmetric games of complete information), generalizing extant results.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)935-965
Number of pages31
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume68
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1 2019

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

  • Bayesian game
  • Behavioral strategy
  • Discontinuous game
  • Existence of Nash equilibrium
  • Skew-symmetric game

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