On the evaluation of bidding strategies in sequential auctions

TY - JOUR

T1 - On the evaluation of bidding strategies in sequential auctions

AU - Katehakis, Michael N.

AU - Puranam, Kartikeya S.

N1 - Funding Information: We acknowledge support for this work from the National Science Foundation, NSF grant CMMI-1662629 . Publisher Copyright: © 2021 Elsevier B.V.

PY - 2021/11

Y1 - 2021/11

N2 - This paper provides further insight into the structure of the procurement strategy for a firm that in order to fill the demand of its market builds inventory by participating in sequential auctions. The analysis herein extends previous work by endogenizing the probability of winning an auction using the rise function in order to obtain a concrete characterization of the optimal strategy. Further, an efficient computational algorithm is given and evaluated for specific valuation models for the market.

AB - This paper provides further insight into the structure of the procurement strategy for a firm that in order to fill the demand of its market builds inventory by participating in sequential auctions. The analysis herein extends previous work by endogenizing the probability of winning an auction using the rise function in order to obtain a concrete characterization of the optimal strategy. Further, an efficient computational algorithm is given and evaluated for specific valuation models for the market.

KW - Auctions

KW - Bidding strategies

KW - Rise function

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U2 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2021.09.003

DO - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2021.09.003

M3 - Article

SN - 0167-6377

VL - 49

SP - 829

EP - 836

JO - Operations Research Letters

JF - Operations Research Letters

IS - 6

ER -