Abstract
This article takes up, in six sections, issues of realism and of ontological and conceptual relativity. The first section briefly lays out the kind of absolutist realism of interest in what follows. The second section considers arguments against ordinary common-sense entities such as bodies, and for the view that subjects enjoy a superior ontological position. No such argument is found persuasive. The third lays out three options in ontology, opts for a kind of conceptual relativism, and takes up three problems for the proposed view. The fourth section then offers a compromise position based on a kind of existential relativity meant to accommodate our most settled beliefs about what there is, while retaining a fundamentally realist and objectivist ontology. The main argument of that section relies on a distinction between (a) semantical relativity and (b) ontological relativity.
Original language | American English |
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Title of host publication | The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191577284 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780199284221 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 2 2009 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
Keywords
- Absolutist realism
- Common-sense entities
- Conceptual relativity
- Objectivist ontology
- Ontological relativity