Outscoping and Discourse Threat

Theodore Sider

doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2014.904988

Outscoping and Discourse Threat

Theodore Sider

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

For various philosophical purposes it is sometimes necessary to give truth-conditions for sentences of a discourse in other terms. According to Agustín Rayo, when doing so it is sometimes legitimate to use the terms of that very discourse, so long as the terms do not occur in the truth-conditions themselves. I argue that giving truth-conditions in this 'outscoping' way prevents one from answering 'discourse threat' (for example, the threat of indeterminacy).

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	413-426
Number of pages	14
Journal	Inquiry (United Kingdom)
Volume	57
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2014.904988
State	Published - Jul 2014
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Philosophy
Health Policy

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Cite this

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Outscoping and Discourse Threat

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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