Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

Perceptions guide our actions and provide us with evidence of the world around us. Illusions and hallucinations can mislead us: they may prompt as to act in ways that do not mesh with the world around us and they may lead us to form false beliefs about that world. The capacity view provides an account of evidence that does justice to these two facts. It shows in virtue of what illusions and hallucinations mislead us and prompt us to act. Moreover, it shows in virtue of what we are in a better epistemic position when we perceive than when we hallucination. In this paper, I develop the capacity view, that is, the view that perceptual experience has epistemic force in virtue of the epistemic and metaphysical primacy of the perceptual capacities employed in perception. By grounding the epistemic force of experience in facts about the metaphysical structure of experience, the capacity view is not only an externalist view, but moreover a naturalistic view of the epistemology of perceptual experience. So it is an externalist and naturalistic alternative to reliabilism. I discuss the repercussions of this view for the justification of beliefs and the epistemic transparency of mental states, as well as, familiar problem cases.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)875-896
Number of pages22
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume173
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2016

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • Capacities
  • Epistemic transparency
  • Evil demon
  • Factive evidence
  • Justification
  • Perception
  • Phenomenal evidence
  • Speckled hen

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