Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge

Erik J. Olsson

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

64 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

It is widely agreed that knowledge has greater value than mere true belief. This chapter begins by identifying a weak sense of 'know' (in which it means 'believe truly') under which knowledge cannot have greater value. There is a stronger sense of 'know' for which the value superiority thesis is plausible. The chapter offers two solutions to the swamping problem. The conditional probability solution states that reliabilist knowledge is more valuable than true belief because the former is a better indicator than the latter of future true belief. The second solution explains how a reliable process token can bring independent value into the picture. This can happen either because the value of a token process derives from the type it instantiates (typeinstrumentalism) or because the value associated with a reliable process acquires independent, not merely derivative, value (value autonomization). The chapter's final section contrasts our approaches with those of virtue epistemology.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationEpistemic Value
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780191710827
ISBN (Print)9780199231188
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 2009

Fingerprint

Value of Knowledge
Reliabilism
Virtue Epistemology
Conditional Probability
Superiority
Derivatives
Final Chapter

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Keywords

  • Conditional probability
  • Naturalized epistemology
  • Reliabilism
  • Swaping problem
  • Type instrumentalism
  • Value autonomization
  • Value of knowledge
  • Virtue epistemology
  • Weak knowledge

Cite this

Olsson, E. J. (2009). Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge. In Epistemic Value Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.003.0002
Olsson, Erik J. / Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge. Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press, 2009.
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Olsson, EJ 2009, Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge. in Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.003.0002

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Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press, 2009.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

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