Abstract
In choosing between moral alternatives-choosing between various forms of ethical action-we typically make calculations of the following kind: A is better than B; B is better than C; therefore A is better than C. These inferences use the principle of transitivity and are fundamental to many forms of practical and theoretical theorizing, not just in moral and ethical theory but in economics. Indeed they are so common as to be almost invisible. What this book shows is that, shockingly, if we want to continue making plausible judgments, we cannot continue to make these assumptions. The book shows that we are committed to various moral ideals that are, surprisingly, fundamentally incompatible with the idea that "better than" can be transitive. The book develops many examples where value judgments that we accept and find attractive, are incompatible with transitivity. While this might seem to leave two options-reject transitivity, or reject some of our normative commitments in order to keep it-the book's position is neutral on which path to follow, only making the case that a choice is necessary, and that the cost either way will be high. The book is a deeply unsettling work of skeptical philosophy that mounts an important new challenge to contemporary ethics.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Number of pages | 640 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780199932214 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780199759446 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - May 24 2012 |
| Event | Rethinking the Good - Duration: May 24 2012 → … |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Arts and Humanities(all)
Keywords
- Ethical action
- Ethical theory
- Moral alternatives
- Moral ideals
- Moral theory
- Normative commitments
- Principle of transitivity
- Value judgments
Cite this
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Rethinking the Good : Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning. / Temkin, Larry.
Oxford University Press, 2012. 640 p.Research output: Book/Report › Book
TY - BOOK
T1 - Rethinking the Good
T2 - Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning
AU - Temkin, Larry
PY - 2012/5/24
Y1 - 2012/5/24
N2 - In choosing between moral alternatives-choosing between various forms of ethical action-we typically make calculations of the following kind: A is better than B; B is better than C; therefore A is better than C. These inferences use the principle of transitivity and are fundamental to many forms of practical and theoretical theorizing, not just in moral and ethical theory but in economics. Indeed they are so common as to be almost invisible. What this book shows is that, shockingly, if we want to continue making plausible judgments, we cannot continue to make these assumptions. The book shows that we are committed to various moral ideals that are, surprisingly, fundamentally incompatible with the idea that "better than" can be transitive. The book develops many examples where value judgments that we accept and find attractive, are incompatible with transitivity. While this might seem to leave two options-reject transitivity, or reject some of our normative commitments in order to keep it-the book's position is neutral on which path to follow, only making the case that a choice is necessary, and that the cost either way will be high. The book is a deeply unsettling work of skeptical philosophy that mounts an important new challenge to contemporary ethics.
AB - In choosing between moral alternatives-choosing between various forms of ethical action-we typically make calculations of the following kind: A is better than B; B is better than C; therefore A is better than C. These inferences use the principle of transitivity and are fundamental to many forms of practical and theoretical theorizing, not just in moral and ethical theory but in economics. Indeed they are so common as to be almost invisible. What this book shows is that, shockingly, if we want to continue making plausible judgments, we cannot continue to make these assumptions. The book shows that we are committed to various moral ideals that are, surprisingly, fundamentally incompatible with the idea that "better than" can be transitive. The book develops many examples where value judgments that we accept and find attractive, are incompatible with transitivity. While this might seem to leave two options-reject transitivity, or reject some of our normative commitments in order to keep it-the book's position is neutral on which path to follow, only making the case that a choice is necessary, and that the cost either way will be high. The book is a deeply unsettling work of skeptical philosophy that mounts an important new challenge to contemporary ethics.
KW - Ethical action
KW - Ethical theory
KW - Moral alternatives
KW - Moral ideals
KW - Moral theory
KW - Normative commitments
KW - Principle of transitivity
KW - Value judgments
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BT - Rethinking the Good
PB - Oxford University Press
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