(Selfie)ishness: using the I-It/I-Thou distinction to parse an ethics of self-portraiture

Serena C. Lin; Miles C. Coleman

doi:10.1080/10253866.2019.1586679

(Selfie)ishness: using the I-It/I-Thou distinction to parse an ethics of self-portraiture

Serena C. Lin
, Miles C. Coleman

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Martin Buber’s I-It/I-Thou distinction is presented in this article as a useful analytic framework for approaching the ethics of self-portraiture without unnecessarily falling back on the (not always helpful) psychological term of narcissism. The result of the application of Buber’s I-It/I-Thou to self-portraiture will reveal that, while some acts can represent the sort of championing of the self over others that we find worrisome in selfies, this is not productively discovered with the language of narcissism. Instead of looking for self-focus as the locus of ethics, the framework of Buber’s I-It/I-Thou asks that analysts look for the legitimacy of the second-personal demands that an instance of selfie-taking places on other persons. Implications to communication ethics are discussed.

Original language	American English
Pages (from-to)	429-438
Number of pages	10
Journal	Consumption Markets and Culture
Volume	23
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/10253866.2019.1586679
State	Published - Sep 2 2020
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Social Psychology
Anthropology
Economics and Econometrics
Marketing

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10.1080/10253866.2019.1586679

Cite this

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abstract = "Martin Buber{\textquoteright}s I-It/I-Thou distinction is presented in this article as a useful analytic framework for approaching the ethics of self-portraiture without unnecessarily falling back on the (not always helpful) psychological term of narcissism. The result of the application of Buber{\textquoteright}s I-It/I-Thou to self-portraiture will reveal that, while some acts can represent the sort of championing of the self over others that we find worrisome in selfies, this is not productively discovered with the language of narcissism. Instead of looking for self-focus as the locus of ethics, the framework of Buber{\textquoteright}s I-It/I-Thou asks that analysts look for the legitimacy of the second-personal demands that an instance of selfie-taking places on other persons. Implications to communication ethics are discussed.",

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(Selfie)ishness: using the I-It/I-Thou distinction to parse an ethics of self-portraiture

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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