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The Contingency of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles in Leibniz

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Abstract

Leibniz holds that there are no two perfectly similar things, a doctrine he calls the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (the PII). What is his attitude toward its modal status? Most commentators hold that the principle is best understood as a necessary truth because it is allegedly entailed by doctrines such as the conceptual containment theory of truth, the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR), and the denial of purely extrinsic denominations, which are arguably regarded by Leibniz as necessary truths. In this paper, I argue against this consensus and show that (1) neither the conceptual containment theory of truth, nor the PSR, nor the denial of purely extrinsic denominations give Leibniz a good reason to hold that the PII is necessary; (2) Leibniz says that the PII is contingent in the correspondence with Clarke and not for dialectical reasons; and (3) the argument that Leibniz gives for the PII in §21 of his Fifth Letter to Clarke has been misunderstood; properly interpreted, it gives Leibniz a cogent argument rooted in some of his most important doctrines for the conclusion that the PII is a contingent truth.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)75-96
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of the History of Philosophy
Volume63
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2025

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • Leibniz
  • metaphysics
  • modality
  • the Principle of Sufficient Reason
  • the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles

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