The Hobbesian Trap

Sandeep Baliga; Tomas Sjöström

doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195392777.013.0005

The Hobbesian Trap

Sandeep Baliga, Tomas Sjöström

School of Arts and Sciences, Economics

Rutgers, The State University

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

What prevents the interested parties from revealing the private information they have to avoid suboptimal outcomes? Due to the conflictual relation between the parties, each has an incentive to lie and deceive the other; this incentive, in turn, calls into question the credibility of communication between the two. This article focuses primarily on the strategic transmission of information. It uses a two-by-two game with strategic complementarities to illustrate how the costless, though imprecise, transmission of information can be used to deceive, or possibly enlighten, and induce either peace or conflict.

Original language	American English
Title of host publication	The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict
Publisher	Oxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)	9780199940806
ISBN (Print)	9780195392777
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195392777.013.0005
State	Published - Apr 20 2012

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Keywords

Conflictual relation
Game theory
Private information
Strategic transmission
War information

Access to Document

https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195392777.013.0005

Cite this

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The Hobbesian Trap

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Keywords

Access to Document

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