Abstract
It is shown that the Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering appears as a very natural solution to the problem of defining social preferences over distributions of divisible goods. The paper analyses various ways of deriving this social ordering from minimally egalitarian conditions and informational parsimony requirements.
| Original language | American English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 145-166 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | Review of Economic Design |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Apr 2005 |
| Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Keywords
- Egalitarian-equivalence
- Fairness
- Social choice
- Social welfare
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