The war of information

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

32 Scopus citations


We analyse political contests (campaigns) between two parties with opposing interests. Parties provide costly information to voters who choose a policy. The information flow is continuous and stops when both parties quit. Parties' actions are strategic substitutes: increasing one party's cost makes that party provide more and its opponent provide less information. For voters, parties' actions are complements and hence raising the advantaged party's cost may be beneficial. Asymmetric information adds a signalling component resulting in a belief threshold at which the informed party's decision to continue campaigning offsets other unfavourable information.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)707-734
Number of pages28
JournalReview of Economic Studies
Issue number2
StatePublished - Apr 2012

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


  • Campaign spending
  • Political competition


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