Abstract
On the truthmaker view of ontological commitment [Heil (From an ontological point of view, 2003); Armstrong (Truth and truthmakers, 2004); Cameron (Philosophical Studies, 2008)], a theory is committed to the entities needed in the world for the theory to be made true. I argue that this view puts truthmaking to the wrong task. None of the leading accounts of truthmaking-via necessitation, supervenience, or grounding-can provide a viable measure of ontological commitment. But the grounding account does provide a needed constraint on what is fundamental. So I conclude that truthmaker commitments are not a rival to quantifier commitments, but a needed complement. The quantifier commitments are what a theory says exists, while the truthmaker commitments are what a theory says is fundamental.
| Original language | American English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 7-19 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Philosophical Studies |
| Volume | 141 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Oct 2008 |
| Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy
Keywords
- Commitment
- Fundamental
- Grounding
- Truthmaker