Welfare Distribution in Two-sided Random Matching Markets

Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Geng Zhao

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We study the welfare structure in two-sided matching markets when agents have latent preferences generated according to observed characteristics. Specifically, we are interested in the empirical welfare distribution of agents on each side of the market under stable outcomes as well as the relation between the outcomes of each side of the market.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationEC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages122
Number of pages1
ISBN (Electronic)9798400701047
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 9 2023
Event24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2023 - London, United Kingdom
Duration: Jul 9 2023Jul 12 2023

Publication series

NameEC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Conference

Conference24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2023
Country/TerritoryUnited Kingdom
CityLondon
Period7/9/237/12/23

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Computational Mathematics
  • Statistics and Probability

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